Moral and legal implications of the continuity between delusional and non-delusional beliefs by Sullivan-Bissett, Ema et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1093/med/9780198722373.003.0010
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Sullivan-Bissett, E., Bortolotti, L., Broome, M., & Mameli, M. (2016). Moral and legal implications of the continuity
between delusional and non-delusional beliefs. In G. Keil, L. Keuck, & R. Hauswald (Eds.), Vagueness in
Psychiatry Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/med/9780198722373.003.0010
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Moral and Legal Implications of  the Continuity between Delusional 
and Non-delusional Beliefs 
 
Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Philosophy Department, University of  Birmingham 
Lisa Bortolotti, Philosophy Department, University of  Birmingham 
Matthew Broome, Department of  Psychiatry, University of  Oxford 
Matteo Mameli, Philosophy Department, King’s College London 
 
Acknowledgements: Lisa Bortolotti, Matteo Mameli and Matthew Broome acknowledge 
the support of  the Wellcome Trust for a project entitled ‘Moral Responsibility and 
Psychopathology’ (WT099880MA). Lisa Bortolotti and Ema Sullivan-Bissett acknowledge 
the support of  the Arts and Humanities Research Council for a project entitled ‘Epistemic 
Innocence of  Imperfect Cognitions’ (AH/K003615/1) and of  a European Research Council 
Consolidator Grant (grant agreement 616358) for a project entitled ‘Pragmatic and 
Epistemic Role of  Factually Erroneous Cognitions and Thoughts’ (PERFECT). All four 
authors are grateful to Geert Keil for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of  this 
chapter.  
 
 
Abstract (248 words) 
In this paper we explore two aspects of  gradualism as they apply to the phenomenon of  
delusions, that is, the acknowledgement that it is difficult to distinguish pathological from 
non-pathological beliefs and the defence of  the view that there is considerable continuity 
between delusional and other epistemically faulty beliefs. We also identify the implications of  
these two aspects of  gradualism for questions about one’s moral and legal responsibility for 
action that is motivated by one’s delusional beliefs. In the first section of  the paper, we argue 
that an effective demarcation between pathological and non-pathological beliefs cannot be 
successfully achieved on mere epistemic grounds, that is, on the basis of  the epistemic 
quality of  the relevant belief-forming and belief-maintaining processes. We offer some 
reasons to endorse the thesis that delusional beliefs are continuous with other epistemically 
faulty beliefs. In the second section of  the paper, we examine the implications of  the 
continuity thesis for the association—common in everyday thinking but also in ethical and 
legal frameworks—between being diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder featuring delusions 
and having reduced or no responsibility for action that is motivated by one’s delusions. We 
consider some interesting cases of  agents who committed crimes related to the content of  
their epistemically faulty beliefs, and ask whether their beliefs qualifying as delusions makes a 
difference to whether such agents were responsible for their actions. Finally, we make some 
suggestions about how the continuity thesis can inform attributions of  moral and legal 
responsibility for action.  
 
Keywords:  
Continuity thesis, gradualism, delusion, belief, moral responsibility, legal accountability, 
epistemic faults. 
 
Introduction  
In this paper we explore two aspects of  gradualism about mental illness by arguing that it is 
difficult to distinguish pathological and non-pathological beliefs on the basis of  their 
epistemic features, and examining and ultimately defending the claim that there is no 
categorical difference between delusional and other epistemically faulty beliefs (what we shall 
call the continuity thesis). In section one, we argue that no effective demarcation between 
pathological and non-pathological beliefs can be achieved on the basis of  mere epistemic 
criteria and we appeal to considerations about the factors influencing belief  formation. This 
seems to support the continuity thesis. In section two, we consider some of  the moral and 
legal implications of  the continuity thesis, focusing in particular on the role of  epistemically 
faulty beliefs in the attribution of  moral responsibility and legal accountability for criminal 
actions that are motivated by those beliefs.  
 
1. Delusional and Non-delusional Belief   
Belief  is an attitude with a standard of  correctness, according to which true beliefs are 
correct and false beliefs are incorrect. We might say that it is ‘part of  the “job description” 
of  belief  as a distinctive propositional attitude that beliefs are correct or incorrect depending 
upon the state of  the world’ (Railton 1994: 74). While other cognitive states can have 
contents which are true or false, truth and falsehood are a ‘dimension of  assessment of  
beliefs as opposed to many other psychological states or dispositions’ (Williams 1970: 136). 
Correctness conditions then follow not only from the propositional content of  a state, but 
also from the state itself. We also evaluate beliefs with respect to epistemic values other than 
truth; they are appropriate targets for claims about whether they are rational or justified. 
Epistemic norms including norms of  evidence (‘a belief  is correct if  it rests upon sufficient 
evidence’), knowledge (‘a belief  is correct if  and only if  it aims at knowledge’), and 
rationality (‘a belief  is correct if  and only if  it is rational’) are thought to be ones which 
govern belief  (Engel 2007: 181). These norms govern only belief—it is inappropriate to say 
of  my imaginings or supposings that they are rational, irrational, justified, unjustified, and so 
on.  
Many philosophers have taken such features of  belief  to highlight something 
necessary about its nature, and have sought to explain the conditions under which beliefs are 
formed, and the norms to which we seem to respond. Some philosophers do this by appeal 
to belief ’s having an aim (McHugh 2011 and 2012; Steglich-Petersen 2006 and 2009; 
Velleman 2000). Belief, it is suggested, is something which aims at the truth, such that, as 
believers, we aim to believe that p only if  p is true.1 Others have claimed that belief  is norm-
governed, though there has been considerable debate over what the norm governing belief  
is. Where normative theorists agree is on the claim that belief  is governed by a norm, and it 
is by appeal to this norm that we can explain why beliefs have a standard of  correctness and 
                                                 
1 At least one other aim of  belief  has been put forward by Conor McHugh, the aim of  knowledge (McHugh 
2011). It is beyond the scope of  this chapter to discuss the various formulations of  the aim account, we only 
mention it here to make salient the idea that ordinary beliefs are idealised in certain respects. This omission is 
also acceptable since, as Timothy Chan has pointed out, ‘[g]iven that knowledge entails truth, if  belief  aims at 
knowledge, it also aims at truth’ (Chan 2013: 10). 
are governed by epistemic norms  (see for example Shah 2003; Shah and Velleman 2005; 
Wedgwood 2002).2  
 The teleological account explains belief ’s standard of  correctness by pointing out 
that ‘believing p is correct only if  p is true because only true beliefs achieve the aim involved 
with believing’ (Steglich-Petersen 2009: 395). The other epistemic norms we highlighted 
earlier—those of  evidence, knowledge, and rationality—are explained by teleological 
accounts with the claim that ‘following them promotes the aim of  believing truly’ (Steglich-
Petersen 2009: 396). If  aims have rules or standards associated with the achieving of  that 
aim, then epistemic norms might be considered the rules or standards conducive to 
achieving belief ’s aim (McHugh 2011: 371).  
According to the normative account of  belief, it is part of  the concept of  a belief  that 
a belief  is correct if  and only if  it is true. Other epistemic norms are easily explicable by the 
normative theorist since according to her account of  belief  ‘the normative properties of  
belief  are constitutive of  belief, and are thus explained by the very nature of  belief ’ (Chan 
2013: 6). 
The aim and norm accounts of  belief  offer explanations of  our epistemic 
behaviours (such as focusing on the truth when we think about what to believe, gathering 
evidence, revising beliefs upon new evidence, and so on). The explanations offered involve 
the claims that belief  is constitutively aimed at truth or governed by a norm of  truth. It is 
consistent with such accounts that there can be a break between truth and other epistemic 
features (there can be a rational false belief, or a justified false belief, for example). But even 
in cases in which we come to believe something false, we are guided by the aim of  belief, or 
we manifest our commitment to a norm of  belief, and these aims or norms are said to be 
explanatory of  our epistemic practice.  
Delusions fail to meet many epistemic standards. It might look like they are not 
beliefs which are aimed at truth or governed by a norm of  truth, that they are not responsive 
                                                 
2 These are not view that authors endorse, but they are ones which demonstrate how we might think about 
non-delusional beliefs, their link with truth, and the conditions under which they are formed (see Sullivan-
Bissett 2014, chapters two and three for objections to these accounts).  
to evidence in the ways which ordinary beliefs typically are. They might be considered as less 
responsive or even non-responsive to the epistemic norms outlined earlier, which we think 
other beliefs are responsive to.  Differences between delusional and non-delusional beliefs 
have led some philosophers to argue that delusions are not beliefs at all, but are rather, for 
example, misidentified imaginings (Currie 2000) or empty speech acts (Berrios 1991).3 The 
DSM-5 describes delusions as follows:  
Fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of  conflicting evidence. Their content may 
include a variety of  themes (e.g. persecutory, referential, somatic, religious, grandiose). [...] 
Delusions are deemed bizarre if  they are clearly implausible and not understandable to same-
culture peers and do not derive from ordinary life experiences. [...] The distinction between a 
delusion and a strongly held idea is sometimes difficult to make and depends in part on the 
degree of  conviction with which the belief  is held despite clear or reasonable contradictory 
evidence regarding its veracity. (American Psychiatric Association DSM-5 2013) 
As with all definitions of  delusions, the DSM-5 definition is controversial, but if  we 
compare it with another influential definition we cannot but notice that the focus is on the 
epistemic surface features of  delusions:  
A person is deluded when they have come to hold a particular belief with a degree of firmness 
that is both utterly unwarranted by the evidence at hand, and that jeopardises their day-to-day 
functioning. (McKay, Langdon, and Coltheart 2005: 315). 
Delusional beliefs are also formed on the basis of  insufficient evidence, and may also be 
incompatible or badly integrated with the persons’ other beliefs (Bortolotti and Broome 
2008: 822). These characterisations of  delusion as fixed beliefs, which are not amenable in light 
of  evidence, and held with a degree of  firmness that is utterly unwarranted by the evidence at hand, 
implies that non-delusional, ordinary beliefs are ‘constantly modified by their experiential 
validation or refutation’ (Maher 1988: 32), and so people with delusions are failing to do 
something which people without delusions routinely do.  
                                                 
3    We will assume a doxastic approach to delusions in this paper (for a defence of  doxasticism see Bayne and 
Pacherie 2005, and Bortolotti 2009, 2012). 
Given that aims and norm accounts of  belief  are seeking to explain the constraints 
under which people believe (that is, why they focus on evidence, why truth is their guide, and 
why they are responsive to norms of  evidence, knowledge, and rationality in their belief  
formation), if  delusions are not subject to such constraints this might mark them out as 
different from ordinary beliefs. On the basis of  their considerable epistemic faults, 
delusional beliefs might look different from ordinary, non-delusional beliefs exhibiting a 
difference in kind and not just in degree. This is precisely the conclusion we seek to resist in 
this chapter. 
 
1.1. Non-delusional epistemically faulty belief 
Here we suggest that non-delusional beliefs are idealised in the psychological and especially 
in the philosophical literature. We do this by considering two kinds of  epistemically faulty 
belief  as they appear in the non-clinical population: beliefs from doxastic biases and beliefs 
from self-deception. We shall show that these beliefs also exhibit failures of  rationality and 
depart from epistemically ideal practices of  belief  formation and belief  maintenance.  
1.1.1. Doxastic biases 
A practice is a doxastic bias if  it is an unreliable (in terms of  truth) doxastic practice (Hazlett 
2013: 41). The self-enhancement bias is one example of  a widespread doxastic bias, and this 
encompasses ‘overly positive self-evaluation, unrealistic optimism, illusions of  control, self-
serving causal attributions, valence biases in recall and processing speeds, biased attention to 
evidence, [and] biased self-focused attention’ (Hazlett 2013: 52). In an oft-cited study which 
looked into the self-perceptions of  people with and without depression, the self-ratings of  
participants across various dimensions were compared with the ratings of  those participants 
as given by other people. What was found was that the ‘initial self-perceptions of  the 
depressed subjects were less discrepant with observer ratings’ than controls (Lewinsohn et al 
1980: 210). The self-ratings of  people with depression ‘did not differ significantly’ from 
those of  their observers, whereas controls rated themselves ‘significantly more positively’ 
than did their observers. People with depression, then, were the ‘most realistic’ with regard 
to their self-perceptions, whereas controls ‘were engaged in self-enhancing distortions’ 
(Lewinsohn et al 1980: 211). 
Several other studies have shown that most people are vulnerable to positive 
illusions, considering themselves (and sometimes their romantic partners) to be above 
average, or better than most other people, when asked about positive traits and abilities. 
Moreover, people tend to exhibit unrealistic optimism about their future underestimating 
their likelihood of  experiencing negative events, and overestimating their likelihood of  
experiencing positive events (for a review see Hazlett 2013, and Bortolotti and Antrobus 
2015). In the psychological literature, the suggestion has been made that the positive illusions 
and unrealistic optimism are adaptive and contribute to mental health, making people 
happier, more productive and creative, more caring, more resilient (Taylor 1989; Sharot 
2011). In his discussion of  the empirical studies, Peter Railton claims that ‘[i]t would appear 
to be part of  the normal, healthy operation of  one’s self  image that one discount negative 
evidence and defy the odds’ (Railton 1994: 93).  
The biases discussed here serve to modify the standards for sufficient evidence 
required for belief. People do not treat evidence in the ways that they do on purely epistemic 
grounds, and non-epistemic factors are involved when people form beliefs about themselves 
or make predictions about their own future.  
 
1.1.2. Self-deception 
In self-deception, beliefs include a motivational element which can involve the misreading or 
ignoring of  evidence in coming to a belief. The motivational element of  the belief  forming 
process might be a pro-attitude towards a proposition being true (wishful self-deception), a 
proposition being believed (willful self-deception), or a proposition being false (dreadful self-
deception) (Van Leeuwen 2007: 423–5).  
Let us give an example to demonstrate the non-epistemic factors involved in self-
deceptive belief  formation. Consider the person who has the false and motivated belief  that 
his wife is faithful. There may be evidence available to the person that his wife is unfaithful, 
insofar as certain features of  her behaviour are perceptually available to him (he sees that she 
arrives home late, that she is uninterested in him, and so on). We might think though that the 
alternative, epistemically more worthy belief  that his wife is unfaithful is unavailable in a 
weaker sense, a kind of  motivational unavailability. The person, we can presume, is highly 
motivated for it to be the case that his wife is faithful (wishful self-deception), or at least, for 
it to be the case that he believes that his wife is faithful (wilful self-deception). Consider 
another case, a case of  a person with anorexia nervosa, who might come to believe that she 
is overweight, and she is motivated for her being so to be false (dreadful self-deception). Is 
the person in these cases is trying to aim at the truth when she forms beliefs (as the 
teleological account of  belief  would claim)? Or is she responding to a norm of  belief  (as the 
normative account of  belief  would claim)? It might be that she is, but what it is that makes it 
the case that these beliefs are aimed at truth or governed by a norm of  truth might be very 
different from what is going on in a more epistemically ideal case where motivational factors 
are not playing a significant role in the fixation of  belief.  
 
1.2. Non-epistemic factors in faulty belief 
We found common instances of  belief  that fail to satisfy the standards that delusions also 
fail to meet. Either the mechanisms responsible for belief-production are not solely geared, 
in all cases, towards truth, or even when they are, they often miss that target. The cases of  
belief  we have discussed above depart considerably from the idealised conception of  beliefs 
as mental states that are responsive to evidence and revised in the light of  counterevidence. 
The formation and maintenance of  the beliefs we considered seem to be paradigmatically 
influenced by non-epistemic factors.  
To further explain what the cases have in common and how they can be regarded as 
instances of  epistemically faulty belief, we can look to Yaacov Trope and Akiva Liberman’s 
(1996) idea of  confidence thresholds for belief. The idea here is that there is a correlation 
between a person’s confidence threshold and the evidence that is required to reach the 
threshold, the lower the first, the less evidence required to reach it. The acceptance threshold is 
‘the minimum confidence in the truth of  a hypothesis that [one] requires before accepting it, 
rather than continuing to test it’, while the rejection threshold is ‘the minimum confidence in the 
untruth of  a hypothesis that [one] requires before rejecting it and discontinuing the test’ 
(Trope and Liberman 1996: 253, cited in Mele 2000: 34). What is meant by cost of  information 
is the resources and effort that the person requires in order to acquire and process 
information relevant to the target proposition. What is meant by cost of  false acceptance and cost 
of  false rejection is the subjective importance the person attaches to avoiding falsely believing a 
proposition and avoiding falsely believing the negation of  a proposition, respectively (Trope 
and Liberman 1996: 252, cited in Mele 2000: 34). If  this model is correct, our desires can 
influence our beliefs by functioning to change our confidence thresholds: (1) in several cases 
of  doxastic bias, pro-attitudes play a role in belief  formation; (2) in the case of  self-
deception, an attitude towards the target proposition plays a role in generating a belief  in 
that proposition, a belief  which would not be acquired were the attitude absent. So belief  
formation is often influenced by non-epistemic factors, which include motivational factors. 4 
Allan Hazlett suggests that there might be coping mechanisms in the form of  self-
deception to go someway towards offsetting the negative consequences of  bad life events, 
and that such mechanisms might also give rise to ‘less extreme’ biases which might be ‘useful 
as means of  coping with the events of  everyday life’ (Hazlett 2013: 61). Ryan McKay and 
Daniel Dennett (2009) go as far as to argue for the presence of  a doxastic shear pin, a 
mechanism that allows desires to influence belief  formation when the person would be 
harmed by believing what she has evidence for and would struggle to manage negative 
emotions. In some of  these cases, the epistemically faulty belief  (they call it ‘misbelief ’) can 
be biologically or psychologically adaptive. Interestingly, candidates for adaptive misbeliefs 
include positive illusions and delusions. 
We saw that in many cases non-epistemic factors influence the fixation of  belief, and 
this indicates that a different strength of  regulation for truth, or responsiveness to evidence, 
and so on, applies to different instances of  believing. Hence it is difficult to group all beliefs 
together by appeal to their epistemic surface features. To be clear: we are not suggesting that 
the attitudes resulting from doxastic biases and self-deception are not beliefs, we think that 
they are. Rather our claim is that it is implausible to suggest that the reason why these 
cognitions are beliefs is that they share some good epistemic feature with other non-
                                                 
4 It might be that it is even justified to make justification standards and confidence thresholds context-
relative. This kind of  claim is not the one we are after in this chapter. We are not trying to give a normative 
account of  how beliefs ought to behave, rather, we are doing descriptive work. So we remain neutral on 
whether it is justified or rational to have lower evidence thresholds in some cases. We are just pointing out 
that as a matter of  face, we do have lower thresholds.  
delusional beliefs, and then claim that delusional beliefs are different in kind because they are 
epistemically poor, or lack some good epistemic feature.  
Next we turn to delusions and argue that they are continuous with the epistemic 
faults detected in the two cases discussed above, namely, doxastic biases and self-deception. 
 
1.3. Delusional belief 
Let us turn now to epistemically faulty beliefs that are also delusional. In this section we shall 
argue for the continuity thesis in two steps. First, we notice how the most popular theories 
of  delusion formation are compatible with or actively support the continuity thesis. Second, 
we observe that the epistemic faults that characterise delusional beliefs also characterise non-
delusional beliefs, and in particular beliefs due to doxastic biases or self-deception.   
 
1.3.1. Delusion formation 
Here we cannot provide a detailed description of  all the promising theories of  delusion 
formation discussed in the literature, but by appealing to the most influential proposals we 
aim to show that delusions are best understood as beliefs, and as continuous with non-
delusional beliefs. In particular, delusions are seen as understandable (sometimes even 
rational) responses to anomalous experience. The process by which people form delusions 
should not be described as radically or categorically different from the process by which 
people form ordinary beliefs.  
According to the one-factor account of  delusion formation, people with delusions 
do not suffer from an abnormal deficit or bias in their mechanisms of  belief  formation or 
belief  evaluation. The difference between a person with delusions and a person without is in 
the kinds of  experiences the person with delusions has. Brendan Maher claimed that 
‘delusional beliefs are developed in much the same way that normal beliefs are’ (Maher 1988: 
22), and that the experiences people with delusions have are such as to distort the evidence 
they have available to them. This means that delusions are not held in the face of  obvious 
counterevidence as they are often characterised, but rather are held ‘because of  evidence 
strong enough to support [them]’ (Maher 1974: 99). One-factor accounts do not deny that 
reasoning biases might be involved in the process by which people come to delusional 
beliefs, but claim only that ‘delusions occur when those biases are exaggerated or introduced 
by intractable anomalous experiences [...] the delusion results from an anomalous experience 
rationalized by a mind whose divergence from ideal rationality is within the normal range of  
human psychology’ (Gerrans 2002: 52).  
One popular version of  the one factor theory is the prediction-error theory 
proposed by Phil Corlett and colleagues.5 When people experience something that does not 
match with their current understanding of  the world, a prediction-error signal is produced 
and either the input is reinterpreted or the model of  the world is revised to take into account 
the new experience. The hypothesis is that in people with delusions, the production of  
excessive prediction-error signals falsely suggests that a person’s internal model of  the world 
needs to be updated.  
Prediction error theories of  delusion formation suggest that under the influence of  
inappropriate prediction error signal, possibly as a consequence of  dopamine dysregulation, 
events that are insignificant and merely coincident seem to demand attention, feel important and 
relate to each other in meaningful ways. Delusions ultimately arise as a means of  explaining 
these odd experiences. (Corlett et al. 2009: 1)  
On this account, delusion formation differs from the formation of  other beliefs only in so 
far as prediction-error signalling is disrupted. The process of  belief  formation is the same in 
the case of  delusional and non-delusional beliefs, but the signalling is disrupted in the case 
of  delusions. 
According to the two-factor account of  delusion formation, we need to appeal to 
two factors in order to explain why a person comes to form a delusional belief. The first 
factor is the anomalous experience appealed to by one-factor theorists, but two-factor 
theorists claim that this is not sufficient for the delusion to be formed or maintained and so 
some deficit or bias in belief  forming or maintaining mechanisms also needs to be posited. 
Philosophers and psychologists endorsing this view disagree on how to characterise the 
second factor. Plausible characterisations of  the second factor provided so far indicate a 
                                                 
5 For another account of  delusion formation based on a prediction error model, see Hohwy (2013). 
difference in degree, rather than kind, between delusional and non-delusional beliefs. For 
instance, according to the version of  the two-factor theory recently proposed by Max 
Coltheart and colleagues, people with delusions form beliefs in line with a Bayesian model 
of  abductive inference, according to which ‘one hypothesis H1 explains observations O 
better than another hypothesis H2 just in case P(O|H1) > P(O|H2)’ (Coltheart, Menzies, and 
Sutton 2010: 271). Considering a case of  the Capgras delusion6 where a man mistakes his 
wife for an impostor, the two hypotheses in play are the stranger hypothesis (the woman who 
looks like my wife is not my wife) and the wife hypothesis (the woman who looks like my wife 
is my wife). Coltheart and colleagues argue that ‘the observed data are clearly much more 
likely under the stranger hypothesis than under the wife hypothesis. It would be highly 
improbable for the person to have the low autonomic response if  the person really was his 
wife, but very probable indeed if  the person were a stranger’ (Coltheart, Menzies, and Sutton 
2010: 277)  
[I]f  the stranger hypothesis explains the observed data much better than the wife hypothesis, the 
fact that the stranger hypothesis has a lower prior probability than the wife hypothesis can be 
offset in the calculation of  posterior probabilities. And indeed it seems reasonable to suppose 
that this is precisely the situation with the subject suffering from Capgras delusion. The 
delusional hypothesis provides a much more convincing explanation of  the highly unusual data 
than the non-delusional hypothesis; and this fact swamps the general implausibility of  the 
delusional hypothesis. (Coltheart, Menzies, and Sutton 2010: 278)  
On this view, the second factor explains the maintenance of  the delusion. The person does 
not reject the delusional hypothesis once the disconfirming data starts to come in because he 
seems to be ‘ignoring or disregarding any new evidence that cannot be explained by the 
stranger hypothesis. It is as though he is so convinced of  the truth of  the stranger 
hypothesis by its explanatory power that his conviction makes him either disregard or reject 
all evidence that is inconsistent with the hypothesis, or at least cannot be explained by the 
hypothesis’ (Coltheart, Menzies, and Sutton 2010: 279–80).  
                                                 
6  Capgras delusion is the [b]elief  that others, often related, have been replaced by identical or near identical 
others; variations exist in which objects or animals are believed changed; the symptoms may be chronic or 
permanent’ (Ellis, Luaté, and Retterstøl 1994: 119). 
The account of  delusion formation proposed by Philippa Garety and David 
Hemsley (1994) explicitly endorses the continuity thesis. The basic thought is that delusions 
are formed due to a multiplicity of  factors, including past experience, affect, self-esteem, 
motivation, and biases in reasoning (especially probabilistic reasoning) and perception. Some 
factors interact with one another, and some are more prominent in the formation of  some 
delusions rather than others. There is no need to hypothesise a radical deviation from 
normal processes of  belief  formation and maintenance and some of  the biases responsible 
for the epistemic faults of  delusions, such as selective attention, confirmation bias, and 
jumping to conclusions, may affect people with delusions more than clinical and non-clinical 
controls, but are not distinctive factors. The multifactorial view acknowledges that many of  
the biases responsible for the formation of  delusional beliefs are biases all people are prone 
to, and explicitly characterises the difference between delusional and non-delusional beliefs 
as a difference in degree. 
 
1.3.2. Delusions and other epistemically faulty beliefs 
Beliefs formed as a result of  doxastic biases are continuous with delusional beliefs as their 
epistemic faults can be described in terms of  the beliefs failing to take into account or 
respond to statistical evidence that is available to the person. In some cases, people who 
develop delusional beliefs have the same biases as the rest of  the population, but are 
vulnerable to those biases to a greater extent. For instance, delusional and non-delusional 
beliefs can be due to the attribution error, where the person attributes positive events to 
herself  and negative events to external factors or other people. People who develop 
persecutory delusions may have an exaggerated tendency to fall prey to the attribution error 
and other similar biases (Freeman et al. 2002). In other cases, people who develop delusional 
beliefs have a different bias from the one that affects the rest of  the population, but both 
groups are affected by biases that lead to the formation of  epistemically faulty beliefs. For 
instance, when evaluating evidence for a statement, people tend to wait until they have more 
clues than they need before coming to a decision. This tendency is often called 
‘conservatism’ (Stone and Young 1997; McKay 2012). Empirical evidence suggests that 
people who develop delusions have the opposite tendency and ‘jump to conclusions’, that is, 
come to a decision about whether a statement is true without having sufficient evidence (see 
Fine et al. 2007, but also Ross et al. 2015). This latter tendency is often called ‘revisionism’. 
Both tendencies are epistemically problematic, but conservatism is more widespread in the 
non-clinical population. 
Even the epistemic feature of  delusions that is considered most distinctive—
resistance to counterevidence—is actually a very common feature of  beliefs (Bortolotti 
2009, chapter 2). Once they adopt a hypothesis, people are very reluctant to abandon it, even 
when copious and robust evidence against it becomes available. This is true of  prejudiced 
and superstitious beliefs (see, for example, Rusche and Bewster 2008), but also of  beliefs in 
scientific theories (see, for example, Chinn and Brewer 2001), a context in which 
responsiveness to evidence should be seen as highly important. Self-enhancing beliefs are 
especially resistant to counterevidence, and people keep believing that they are skilled, 
talented, attractive, successful, and so on, even when their life experiences repeatedly suggest 
otherwise. In order to maintain a positive image of  themselves, they reinterpret negative 
feedback and focus on selected evidence that supports their self-enhancing beliefs (Hepper 
and Sedikides 2012). 
Beliefs in the context of  self-deception can be vulnerable to a number of  doxastic 
biases and are also resistant to counterevidence. Indeed, non-clinical instances of  self-
deception have been compared to motivated delusions, that is, those delusions that can be 
construed as playing a defensive function, and other delusions whose formation is affected 
by what the person desires to be true (McKay and Kinsbourne 2010). Motivated delusions 
can include erotomania, where a person believes that another is in love with her; grandiose 
delusions, where the person believes that she is, for example, a largely misunderstood genius; 
and anosognosia, where the person denies a serious impairment.7 In the formation of  such 
delusions, just like in self-deception, motivational influences play a role in the adoption of  a 
belief, and the resulting belief  is not well-supported by or responsive to the evidence.  
These considerations are, obviously, not conclusive. We have considered how 
delusional and non-delusional beliefs are formed, and what epistemic faults delusional and 
non-delusional beliefs are vulnerable to. We might look for the difference between delusions 
                                                 
7 See Mele (2008), Davies (2008), and Bortolotti and Mameli (2012) for a discussion of  how delusions relate to 
self-deception. 
and otherwise epistemically faulty beliefs elsewhere. Considering how a person reacts when 
she is made aware of  her cognitive biases and confronted with powerful arguments against 
her belief  might introduce a significant difference between delusional and non-delusional 
beliefs. We might think that a person with delusional beliefs would reject alternative 
explanations of  her beliefs or experiences offhand, whereas a person with non-delusional 
beliefs would be much more responsive to feedback.  
As it happens, the empirical evidence does not support discontinuity in this area. It is 
well-known that people are very resistant to change their beliefs even when they are told 
what reasoning mistakes and biases affected the formation of  such beliefs (Stalmeier et al. 
1997; Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971; Tversky and Kahneman 1983), and we already saw that 
people ignore or reinterpret negative feedback on their own performance to protect self-
enhancing beliefs. The claim that people with delusions are resistant to cognitive probing 
also needs to be qualified. There are strong indications that cognitive behavioural therapy is 
efficacious in reducing the rigidity of delusional states, and the preoccupation of the person 
with the topic of the delusion (Coltheart 2005; Kingdon et al. 2008). Although the evidence 
gathered so far does not suggest that cognitive behavioural therapy is effective in leading the 
person to abandon a delusion altogether, cognitive probing does contribute to the person 
adopting a more critical attitude towards the content of the delusion (Bortolotti 2009, 
chapter 2).  Thus, focusing on how people respond to challenges is not a promising way to 
argue for discontinuity between delusional and non-delusional beliefs. 
 
1.4. Interim conclusion 
So far we have argued that epistemically faulty delusional and non-delusional beliefs do not 
differ in kind. Delusions, like other beliefs, are resistant to counterevidence, and the 
formation of  delusions, like the formation of  other epistemically faulty beliefs, is influenced 
by non-epistemic factors. In the case of  delusional and non-delusional beliefs alike, there can 
be considerable resistance to abandoning a belief  once it has been adopted and biases and 
motivational factors may influence belief  formation. Next, we move to the moral and legal 
implications of  this view. 
 2. Moral and legal implications of  the continuity view 
What factors should be taken into account when attributing criminal responsibility to 
perpetrators of  severe crimes? Here we would like to discuss three cases of  people with 
epistemically faulty beliefs who committed serious offences. Our purpose is to ask whether 
the presence of  delusional as opposed to non-delusional beliefs is always a reason to doubt the 
responsibility people have for those actions that seem to be guided or motivated by their 
beliefs. If  there is no categorical difference between delusions and other epistemically faulty 
beliefs, why is the presence of  delusions regarded as a key factor in establishing criminal 
responsibility? 
The first case we consider is that of  Bill who attacks a neighbour because he believes 
the neighbour is shouting insults to him and intends to harm him (Broome, Bortolotti, and 
Mameli 2010). The second case is that of  Jeremiah Wright who killed his son while believing 
that his son was a CPR dummy (Kotz 2011). The third case is Anders Breivik’s perpetration 
of  mass murder in Norway (Bortolotti, Broome, and Mameli 2014).  
The analysis of  these cases puts some pressure on the view that the presence of  
delusions is sufficient to determine whether agents are morally responsible and legally 
accountable for their criminal actions.  
 
2.1. Three cases 
2.1.1 Bill 
Matthew Broome and colleagues describe the case of  a young man with a diagnosis of  
schizophrenia who attacked his neighbour after experiencing auditory hallucinations about 
the neighbour making loud noise and insulting him repeatedly. Bill was convicted of  assault 
but his sentence was affected by a pre-existing diagnosis of  schizophrenia. He was sentenced 
to two years’ probation and his custodial sentence was suspended.  
[S]uppose Bill had actually had a very noisy neighbor. What kind of ascription of responsibility 
would we have made in relation to the harm inflicted on his neighbor in those circumstances? 
What kind of punishment would Bill have deserved for his attacking his truly noisy neighbor? 
Should the fact that the experiences were hallucinatory (and thereby that the neighbor was not 
in fact noisy) make a difference in relation to how we conceive of Bill’s responsibility for what 
he did and of the punishment he deserves? It is true that Bill was hallucinating: He was 
hallucinating that his neighbor was making loud noises, and the content of the hallucination 
explains in part why he attacked his neighbor. Had he not hallucinated that his neighbor was 
making loud noises, Bill would have probably not attacked and harmed his neighbor. But it is 
also true that having noisy neighbors does not morally justify assaulting them. That is, had Bill’s 
neighbor been truly noisy, Bill would have still been doing something blameable in assaulting his 
neighbor. If one has a noisy neighbor, then one should try to convince his neighbor to be less 
noisy, and, failing that, one should perhaps call the police. (Broome, Bortolotti, and Mameli 
2010: 182) 
Here, what we find is that the psychotic symptoms experienced by Bill help explain but not 
necessarily justify his aggressive behaviour towards his neighbour. His experiences (auditory 
hallucinations) and delusional beliefs (the belief  that his neighbour intended him harm) help 
explain why he assaulted his neighbour, but the assault was not inescapable or excusable 
given such experiences and beliefs.  
What we can draw from the case of  Bill is that the presence of  delusions is not 
sufficient to regard the person who committed a crime unaccountable due to insanity, 
though of  course the presence of  delusions is relevant to the person’s full psychological 
profile at the time the crime was committed and thus should be taken into account. For 
instance, it is possible that the presence of  the delusion signals the presence of  reasoning 
impairments that affect the agent’s decision-making capacities. 
2.1.2 Jeremiah Wright 
Our next case is different from the case of  Bill in important ways. On 14th August 2011 
Jeremiah Wright killed his seven year old son, Jori, who had cerebral palsy requiring full time 
care (Kotz 2011). He beheaded and dismembered the child in the home he shared with the 
child’s mother. Wright was charged with, and tried for, first-degree murder. Wright was 
suffering from a delusion at the time of  the killing (as well as before and after the act). He 
believed that Jori was not his son, but a CPR (Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation) dummy, 
placed in his home as part of  a government experiment. Wright was found not guilty on the 
grounds of  insanity.  
A police report stated that ‘Wright said that he recently saw the way the dummy 
looked at him and there were signs and little things the dummy did to him that let him know 
that Jori was not his son, but a dummy’ (Quigley 2013). Dr. Sarah DeLand, director at the 
mental facility in which Wright was housed, and George Seiden, a psychiatrist working with 
Wright, testified that Wright believed Jori was a CPR dummy. Wright told DeLand and 
Seiden that Jori was a government social experiment claiming: ‘I don’t believe they can do 
anything to me because it wasn’t a real person. His skull was made of  plastic. He had foam in 
him’ (Quigley 2013). 
Now let us suppose, as we did with the case of  Bill, that Wright’s beliefs were not 
delusional, and their content were true. Let us suppose then that Jori, the seven year old boy, 
was actually a CPR dummy. What ascription of  responsibility would we make with respect to 
the ‘harm’ inflicted on Jori, and what kind of  punishment would Wright deserve? In the case 
of  Bill, his belief  that his neighbour was shouting at him would help explain but not justify 
Bill’s assault, as having noisy neighbours does not justify assaulting them. But if  Wright had a 
CPR dummy in his home, then it would not be obviously morally wrong to ‘decapitate’ and 
‘dismember’ that dummy given that it would not be a living being capable of  feeling pain and 
suffering. 
Wright’s psychotic symptoms, like Bill’s, help explain his behaviour. Bill feels 
threatened and frustrated because he believes his neighbour is causing him trouble and might 
intend to harm him. In addition, Bill might think that other courses of  action are closed to 
him given his history of  mental illness—calling the police, for instance, may not be an 
attractive option if  Bill suspects that the police will not believe him. Wright wants to prevent 
the government from spying on him, and thus wants to destroy the dummy. The difference 
between the two cases is that, in Wright’s case, if  the content of  his belief  were true, it 
would not be morally problematic to destroy the dummy, and the action could be justified by 
Wright’s desire to stop the government’s intrusion in his life. Wright’s actions would be 
permitted given his belief  that Jori was a CPR dummy. Unlike in the case of  Bill then, the 
presence of  Wright’s belief  is sufficient to regard the person who committed the crime 
unaccountable, since what Wright did would not be morally problematic if  his belief  were 
true. Wright’s actions were not inescapable as he could have done otherwise given his beliefs, 
but his delusions seem to offer both some explanation and justification for his actions.  
From the first two cases alone it is obvious that the relationship between delusions 
and criminal responsibility is not a straightforward one. In Bill’s case, the delusion went some 
way toward explaining his action, but it did not justify that action. In Wright’s case, his 
delusions went some way toward explaining and justifying his action as they relieved him of  
culpability. However, his action was not inescapable given his delusional beliefs. 
2.1.3 Anders Breivik  
In July 2011, Anders Breivik killed seventy-seven people in Norway. In August 2012, he was 
sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. As part of  his first psychiatric evaluation, he was 
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and some of  his most implausible beliefs were 
regarded as persistent, systematised, and bizarre delusions. For instance, one belief  he 
reported was that he was the leader of  a Knights Templar organisation which, according to 
the Norwegian police, does not actually exist. However, this first assessment leading to the 
diagnosis of  schizophrenia was overruled by a second assessment, according to which 
Breivik’s strange beliefs were not psychotic symptoms in the context of  schizophrenia or of  
some other psychotic disorder, but could be explained by a personality disorder. Based on 
the fact that he never manifested hallucinations, the second pair of  assessors described 
Breivik’s behaviour as caused by a narcissistic personality disorder accompanied by 
pathological lying (Melle 2013).  
If  it had been shown that Breivik experienced psychotic symptoms at the time of  his 
crime, then he would have faced trial with a diagnosis of  psychosis, and he would have not 
been regarded as accountable for his actions. This is because, in the Norwegian Criminal 
Procedure Code, when one has psychotic symptoms, one cannot be attributed criminal 
responsibility for action: ‘a person is not criminally accountable if  psychotic, unconscious, or 
severely mentally retarded at the time of  the crime’ (Melle 2013: 17). If  Breivik’s diagnosis of  
a psychotic disorder had been confirmed, he would have been regarded as ‘criminally insane’ 
and sentenced to compulsory psychiatric treatment (Måseide 2012). As a result of  the 
second assessment and his new diagnosis of  personality disorder, Breivik was held 
accountable for his actions as he was thought not to have been psychotic at the time of  his 
criminal act.  
Some questions could be raised about the relation of  Breivik’s beliefs to his actions. 
Just like Bill could have attempted to talk to his neighbour or call the police instead of  
planning an assault, and Wright could have removed the ‘dummy’ from his home, or put it 
out of  sight without destroying it, so too Breivik could have genuinely believed that 
multiculturalism was one of  the greatest harms of  Norwegian society without engaging in 
the actions that led him to kill seventy-seven people. Breivik’s thoughts could have been 
channelled into joining a political party in which such views were shared or campaigning 
against Muslims and multiculturalism. That is, his beliefs go some way towards explaining his 
action, but do not justify it and do not make it inescapable. 
 
2.2. Does it matter whether the perpetrator’s beliefs are delusional? 
The cases we have looked at highlight that we cannot assume that the presence of  delusions 
implies no or reduced responsibility for action. A more local and nuanced view of  
responsibility needs to be articulated. More precisely, further argument is needed to support 
the claim that the presence of  delusions and other psychotic symptoms is an appropriate 
criterion for criminal insanity. 
In all the three cases we considered (each coming from a different legal jurisdiction, 
the UK, the US, and Norway), one key question in the psychiatric assessment leading to 
sentencing was whether the person’s system of  beliefs was delusional. We saw that the 
presence of  a diagnosis of  schizophrenia was instrumental to Bill’s lenient sentence. We saw 
that Wright was found not guilty for reasons of  insanity and was committed to a psychiatric 
hospital for care. And we saw that the presence of  delusions alone, if  confirmed by the 
second psychiatric assessment, would have indicated Breivik’s lack of  responsibility for his 
mass murder for the Norwegian Law.  
The continuity thesis we have defended in section one makes it problematic to rely 
so heavily on the presence of  beliefs that are delusional when assessing responsibility. For 
claims about responsibility, the significance of  the presence of  delusional beliefs may derive 
from the following consideration. If  poor reality testing (or some other relevant cognitive 
deficit associated with delusion formation) is affecting the beliefs a person is prepared to 
endorse to the extent that such beliefs are implausible even to members of  the person’s same 
culture or subculture, then maybe such failure of  reality testing (or other relevant cognitive 
deficit) is also implicated in some of  the person’s decision making processes, including those 
processes that led the person to acting criminally. But this link between the presence of  
psychotic symptoms and impaired decision-making is just a hypothesis that needs to be 
tested.  
The assumption that people who have psychotic symptoms or have received a 
diagnosis of  schizophrenia lack responsibility or have reduced responsibility for action 
because their decision-making capacities are impaired is especially problematic, as the 
behaviour of  two people with psychosis or schizophrenia can differ almost entirely. Some 
people with schizophrenia are able to function well, cognitively and socially, and to control 
their delusions to some extent. The presence of  psychiatric symptoms and of  a diagnosis of  
schizophrenia should be taken into account in the courtroom, but it should not be regarded 
as sufficient to determine responsibility. 
 
3. Conclusions and implications 
In section one we defended gradualism with respect to the distinction between delusional 
and non-delusional epistemically faulty beliefs. We argued that there is continuity between 
them: they can be resistant to counterevidence and their formation process may be 
influenced by biases and motivational factors. Reflecting on the recent psychological 
literature on delusions, we saw that the mechanisms posited to explain the adoption of  
delusional hypotheses are not radically different from, but continuous with, standard 
mechanisms of  belief  formation. 
In section two we turned to the implications of  the continuity thesis for moral and 
legal issues concerning responsibility for action. How should we view the presence of  
delusions, which is often considered as a key criterion for criminal insanity, if  there is no 
clear demarcation between delusional and non-delusional beliefs to be made on epistemic 
grounds? We argued that the role of  delusional beliefs in motivating action does not seem to 
be different from the role of  other epistemically faulty non-delusional beliefs, unless we 
assume that the presence of  delusions also signals the presence of  a cognitive deficit that 
impacts on the decision to commit the crime in question. 
Moreover, we suggested that having beliefs that are epistemically faulty, whether 
delusional or not, rarely provides a justification for criminal action. It may contribute to an 
explanation for the crime, but in most cases it does not make the criminal action inescapable 
or excusable.  
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